Typical flow
- A sender or Relay submits an encrypted envelope to
POST /cache/store. - The Cache checks the recipient’s public policy and its own endpoint authorization.
- The recipient signs a short retrieval proof.
- The recipient calls a messages or chunks endpoint.
- After safely persisting the encrypted message locally, the recipient acknowledges it.
Why retrieval needs a proof
Knowing a DID is public information. It must not be sufficient to download that DID’s cached messages. Retrieval and acknowledgement use an Ed25519 proof from a verification method authorized by the recipient’sTalariaCacheService.
The proof binds the operation to:
- Recipient DID and device
- Cache service and exact endpoint
- Authorized key
- Timestamp and one-time nonce
- Requested subject, such as all messages, a chunk group, or sorted message IDs
Important limitations
Cache response objects currently include a proof model whosesignature may be null. Treat it as event metadata, not a cryptographically verifiable Cache receipt, until node signing is enabled.

